Abstract
Introduction
In this paper, we concentrate on automatic techniques to enhance the fault-tolerance level of a program from nonmasking to masking. We focus our attention on masking fault-tolerance as it is often desirable -if not ideal-property for system design. A masking fault-tolerant program ensures that its specification (both safety and liveness) is satisfied even if faults occur. By contrast, after the occurrence of faults, a nonmasking fault-tolerant program merely ensures that it recovers to states from where its specification is satisfied. However, until such a state is reached, safety may be violated. Since a masking fault-tolerant program synthesized thus is correct by construction, there is no need for its proof of correctness. Also, if a masking fault-tolerant program is designed by reusing an existing program then there is a potential that the synthesized program will preserve properties such as efficiency that are difficult to model in an automated synthesis algorithm. Based on these motivations, in [1, 2] , Kulkarni, Arora, and Chippada have presented algorithms for adding fault-tolerance to a fault-intolerant program that provides no guarantees about its behavior if faults occur.
One of the problems in automating the addition of masking faulttolerance to a fault-intolerant program is the complexity of such addition. Specifically, in [1] , Kulkarni and Arora have shown that the addition of masking fault-tolerance to distributed fault-intolerant programs is NP-hard in the state space of the fault-intolerant program. Therefore, if we were to implement the brute-force deterministic implementation of the algorithm in [1] , its application would be limited. Although the heuristic based polynomial-time implementation in [2] solves some of these difficulties, we find that there are other problems in developing such heuristics; e.g., given a state that the fault-intolerant program reaches in the presence of faults, it is difficult to determine if safe recovery can be added from that state.
Given the complexity of adding fault-tolerance to a distributed faultintolerant program and the difficulty of determining if safe recovery can be added from a state reached in the presence of faults, we consider the following question.
Is it possible to reduce the complexity of adding masking fault-tolerance if we begin with a program that provides additional guarantees about its behavior in the presence of faults?
In the context of tools that automate the addition of masking fault-tolerance, the above question is crucial. This question identifies additional properties that should be (possibly, manually) added to a fault-intolerant program in order to benefit from automation. Moreover, if these additional properties are satisfied by the program at hand, we can simplify the addition of masking fault-tolerance.
Adding masking fault-tolerance to a fault-intolerant program involves two tasks: (1) ensuring that the program recovers to states from where it satisfies both the safety and the liveness specification, and (2) ensuring that the program does not violate safety during recovery. The first task requires the automation algorithm to add (recovery) transitions, whereas the second task requires the automation algorithm to remove (safety violating) transitions. The conflicting nature of these tasks increases the complexity of adding masking fault-tolerance. More specifically, during the addition of masking fault-tolerance to a fault-intolerant program, it is possible that the transitions that were removed to deal with safety violation may be important for recovery. Also, the recovery transitions may themselves conflict with each other and, hence, using one recovery transition may force the removal of another recovery transition.
Synthesizing a masking fault-tolerant program from a nonmasking fault-tolerant program separates the above two tasks; the nonmasking fault-tolerant program deals with the first task (recovery) whereas the addition of masking fault-tolerance only needs to deal with the second task (safety). Such separation of concerns has been found to be useful in manual addition of fault-tolerance [3] . More specifically, in [3] , Arora and Kulkarni have presented a stepwise method for adding masking fault-tolerance. In their method, one begins with a fault-intolerant program, and adds nonmasking faulttolerance to it in the first step. Then, in the second step, one enhances the fault-tolerance from nonmasking to masking. They have argued that such a stepwise approach is useful in providing new insights in the design of masking fault-tolerance as well as in simplifying the complexity of (manually) adding masking fault-tolerance.
In this paper, we focus on the enhancement problem that deals with automating the second step in the stepwise addition of masking fault-tolerance. We consider the enhancement problem in the context of two models: the high atomicity model and the low atomicity model. In both models, the program consists of a set of variables and a set of processes. In the high atomicity model, the processes can read all variables in the program. By contrast, for each process, the low atomicity model specifies the set of variables that it can read and a (possibly different) set of variables that it can write. Thus, the low atomicity model allows us to capture several computation models, e.g., shared memory model and message passing model, for distributed programs.
To illustrate our algorithms, we choose two examples: the triple modular redundancy (TMR) and Byzantine agreement programs. We have chosen these examples as the (manual) derivation of the masking version of these programs from their nonmasking version is presented in [3] , and because, we want to determine if our automated algorithm can use the nonmasking fault-tolerant program from [3] to obtain the corresponding masking version. Also, our Byzantine agreement example enables us to compare the derivation of masking Byzantine agreement from its intolerant version (presented in [2] ) to its derivation from a nonmasking Byzantine agreement. We note that we have used our algorithm to derive the masking version of alternating-bit protocol from the corresponding nonmasking version. However, for reasons of space, we do not include that example in this paper.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows: For the high atomicity model, we present a sound and complete algorithm for enhancing fault-tolerance. Thus, if there exists a program that enhances the fault-tolerance of the given nonmasking program to masking, our algorithm will succeed in identifying a masking faulttolerant program. The complexity of this algorithm is polynomial in the state space of the nonmasking fault-tolerant program. We show that this complexity is asymptotically less than the complexity of adding masking fault-tolerance to a fault-intolerant program. For the low atomicity model, we present a sound algorithm for enhancing fault-tolerance. The complexity of this algorithm is also polynomial in the state space of the nonmasking fault-tolerant program. As an illustration of this algorithm, we show how masking faulttolerant Byzantine agreement [4] can be designed using a solution for nonmasking Byzantine agreement. We show that this algorithm simplifies the difficulties encountered in the design in [2] .
Organization of the paper. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide a few basic concepts such as programs, computations, specifications, faults and fault-tolerance. In Section 3, we state the problem of enhancing the fault-tolerance from nonmasking to masking. In Section 4, we present our solution for the high atomicity model. In Section 5, we present our solution for distributed programs. Finally, we make concluding remarks in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give formal definitions of programs, problem specifications, faults, and fault-tolerance. The programs are specified in terms of their state space and their transitions. The definition of specifications is adapted from Alpern and Schneider [5] . The definitions of faults and fault-tolerance are adapted from Arora and Gouda [6] and Kulkarni [7] . The issues of modeling distributed programs is adapted from [1] . A similar modeling of distributed programs in read/write atomicity was independently identified by Attie and Emerson [8, 9] .
Program
A program Ô is a set of finite variables and a set of finite processes. 
Issues of Distribution
Now, we present the issues that distribution introduces during the addition of fault-tolerance. More specifically, we identify how read/write restrictions on a process affect its transitions.
Write restrictions. Given a transition´×¼ × ½µ, it is straightforward to determine the variables that need to be changed in order to modify the state from ×¼ to ×½. 
Specification
A specification is a set of infinite sequences of states that is suffix closed and fusion closed. Suffix closure of the set means that if a state sequence is in that set then so are all the suffixes of . Fusion closure of the set means that if state sequences « × and ¬ × AE are in that set then so are the state sequences « × AE and ¬ × , where « and ¬ are finite prefixes of state sequences, and AE are suffixes of state sequences, and × is a program state.
Following Alpern and Schneider [5] , we let the specification consist of a safety specification and a liveness specification. For a suffix closed and fusion closed specification, the safety specification can be specified [7] as a set of bad transitions, that is, for program Ô, its safety specification is a subset of ´×¼ × ½µ ×¼ × ½ ¾ ËÔ . The liveness specification is not required in our algorithm; the liveness specification satisfied by the nonmasking fault-tolerant program is preserved in the synthesized masking fault-tolerant program.
Given a program Ô, a state predicate Ë, and a specification ×Ô , we say that Ô satisfies ×Ô from Ë iff (1) Ë is closed in Ô, and (2) every computation of Ô that starts in Ë is in ×Ô . If Ô satisfies ×Ô from Ë and Ë , we say that Ë is an invariant of Ô for spec.
For a finite sequence (of states) «, we say that « maintains (does not violate) ×Ô iff there exists a sequence of states ¬ such that «¬ ¾ ×Ô . We say that Ô maintains (does not violate) ×Ô from Ë iff (1) Ë is closed in Ô, and (2) every computation prefix of Ô that starts in a state in Ë maintains ×Ô .
Notation.
Let ×Ô be a specification. We use the term safety of ×Ô to mean the smallest safety specification that includes ×Ô . Also, whenever the specification is clear from the context, we will omit it; thus, Ë is an invariant of Ô abbreviates Ë is an invariant of Ô for spec.
Faults
The faults that a program is subject to are systematically represented by transitions. A fault for program Ô ËÔ AE Ô is a subset of the set ´×¼ × ½µ ×¼ × ½ ¾ ËÔ . We use Ô to denote the transitions obtained by taking the union of the transitions in Ô and the transitions in . We say that a state predicate Ì is an -span (read as fault-span) of Ô from Ë iff the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) Ë µ Ì , and (2) Ì is closed in Ô . Observe that for all computations of Ô that start at states where Ë is true, Ì is a boundary in the state space of Ô up to which (but not beyond which) the state of Ô may be perturbed by the occurrence of the transitions in .
We say that a sequence of states, ×¼ × ½ , is a computation of Ô in the presence of iff the following three conditions are satisfied:
is finite and terminates in state × Ð then there does not exist state × such that × Ð × µ ¾ AEÔ, and (3) 
The first requirement captures that in each step, either a program transition or a fault transition is executed. The second requirement captures that faults do not have to execute, i.e., if the program reaches a state where only a fault transition can be executed, it is not required that the fault transition be executed. It follows that fault transitions cannot be used to deal with deadlocked states. Finally, the third requirement captures that the number of fault occurrences in a computation is finite.
We say that Ô is masking -tolerant (read as fault-tolerant) to ×Ô from Ë iff the following conditions hold: (1) Ô satisfies ×Ô from Ë, and (2) there exists Ì such that Ì is an -span of Ô from Ë, Ô maintains ×Ô from Ì , and every computation of Ô that starts from a state in Ì contains a state of Ë.
Since a nonmasking fault-tolerant program need not satisfy safety in the presence of faults, Ô is nonmasking -tolerant to ×Ô from Ë iff the following conditions hold: (1) Ô satisfies ×Ô from Ë, and (2) there exists Ì such that Ì is an -span of Ô from Ë, and every computation of Ô that starts from a state in Ì contains a state of Ë.
Note that a specification is a set of infinite sequences of states. Hence, if Ô satisfies ×Ô from Ë then all computations of Ô that start in Ë must be infinite. In the context of nonmasking and masking fault-tolerance, every computation from the fault-span reaches a state in its invariant. Hence, if fault-span Ì is used to show that Ô is nonmasking (respectively, masking) -tolerant to ×Ô from Ë then all computations of Ô that start in a state in Ì must also be infinite. Also, note that Ô is allowed to contain a self-loop of the form´×¼ × ¼µ; we use such a self-loop whenever ×¼ is an acceptable fixpoint of Ô.
Notation. Whenever the program Ô is clear from the context, we will omit it; thus, "Ë is an invariant" abbreviates "Ë is an invariant of Ô". Also, whenever the specification ×Ô and the invariant Ë are clear from the context, we omit them; thus, " -tolerant" abbreviates " -tolerant for ×Ô from Ë", and so on.
Problem Statement
In this section, we formally define the problem of enhancing faulttolerance from nonmasking to masking. The input to the enhancement problem includes the (transitions of) nonmasking program, Ô, its invariant, Ë, faults, , and specification, ×Ô . Given Ô, Ë, and , we can calculate an -span, say Ì , of Ô by starting at a state in Ë and identifying states reached in the computations of Ô . Hence, we include fault-span Ì in the inputs of the enhancement problem. As mentioned in the Introduction, the goal of the enhancement problem is to separate the tasks involved in adding recovery transitions and the tasks involved in ensuring safety. The enhancement problem deals only with adding safety to a nonmasking fault-tolerant program. With this intuition, we define the enhancement problem in such a way that only safety may be added while adding masking fault-tolerance. In other words, we require that during the enhancement, no new transitions are added to deal with functionality or to deal with recovery. 
Comments on the Problem Statement
(1) While the invariant, Ë, of the nonmasking fault-tolerant program is an input to the enhancement problem, it is not used explicitly in the requirements of the enhancement problem. The knowledge of Ë permits us to identify the transitions of Ô that provide functionality and the transitions of Ô that provide recovery. We find that such classification of transitions is useful in solving the enhancement problem. Hence, we include Ë in the problem statement. 
Enhancement in High Atomicity Model
In this section, we present our algorithm for the enhancement problem in high atomicity model. Thus, given a high atomicity nonmasking fault-tolerant program Ô, our algorithm derives masking fault-tolerant program Ô ¼ that ensures that safety is added while the recovery provided by Ô is preserved. Hence, we obtain a solution for the enhancement problem by tailoring the algorithm Ð× from [1] ; Ð× deals with the addition of safety to a faultintolerant program in the presence of faults.
In our algorithm, first, we compute the set of states, Ñ×, from where fault actions alone violate safety. Clearly, we must ensure that the program never reaches a state in Ñ×. Hence 
The algorithm High Atomicity Enhancement is sound and complete and its complexity is polynomial in the state space of the nonmasking fault-tolerant program. Please refer to [10] for proof.
Example: Triple Modular Redundancy
As an illustration of our high atomicity algorithm, we show how the masking triple modular redundancy (TMR) program can be designed by enhancing the fault-tolerance level of the corresponding nonmasking program.
First, we present the nonmasking version of TMR program, the specification of TMR, and the fault actions for TMR. Then, we show how our high atomicity algorithm is used to enhance the level of fault-tolerance to masking. to ÓÙØ (using guarded command AE ½). And, if ÓÙØ is assigned a wrong value, i.e., the value other than the majority value, and the value of Ò is not corrupted then process corrects ÓÙØ by copying Ò to ÓÙØ (using guarded command AE ¾). Both nonmasking and masking programs for Ì Å Ê include a self-loop for states in which ÓÙØ has been assigned a correct value. However, for brevity, in this section, we keep such self-loops implicit. Thus, the actions of each process in the nonmasking version of Ì Å Ê are as follows (¨denotes modulo 3 addition):
Faults may perturb one of the inputs when all of them are equal. Thus, the fault action that affects is represented by the following action:
The following state predicate is an invariant of TMR. 
The TMR program consists of three variables whose domain is ¼ ½ and one variable whose domain is ¼ ½
. Enumerating the states associated with these variables, the state space of TMR program includes 24 states. Of these, 10 states are in the invariant, 12 additional states are in the fault-span, and two states are outside the fault-span.
The program consisting of actions AE ½ and AE ¾ is nonmasking faulttolerant in that if the faults perturb it to a state that is outside ËÌ Å Ê then it eventually recovers to a state where ËÌ Å Ê is true. However, until such a state is reached, safety specification may be violated.
Enhancing the tolerance of TMR. We trace the execution of our high atomicity algorithm for nonmasking TMR program.
( Remark. Note that transitions included in AE ¾ are removed from the above masking fault-tolerant program as those transitions violate × ¾. However, if safety consisted of only × ½ then the fault-tolerant program would include the transitions included in AE ¾. While a masking fault-tolerant program can be obtained without using the transitions in AE ¾, their inclusion follows from the heuristic in [1] that the output program should be maximal. In [1] , Kulkarni and Arora have argued that if the output of a synthesis algorithm is to be used as an input, say to add fault-tolerance for a new fault, it is desirable that the intermediate program be maximal.
Enhancement versus Addition
In this section, we compare our enhancement algorithm with Ñ × Ò algorithm in [1] . We compare these two algorithms with respect to their complexity.
Complexity issues.
We compare our high atomicity enhancement algorithm to high atomicity algorithm Ñ × Ò from [1] for adding masking fault-tolerance to a fault-intolerant program. Since Ñ × Ò tries to add both safety and liveness simultaneously, it is more complex than High Atomicity Enhancement presented in this paper. More specifically, the asymptotic complexity of High Atomicity Enhancement is less than that of Ñ × Ò . Thus, if the state space of the problem at hand prevents the addition of masking fault-tolerance to a fault-intolerant program, it may be possible to partially automate the design of a masking fault-tolerant program by manually designing a nonmasking fault-tolerant program and enhancing its fault-tolerance to masking using automated techniques.
We note that the asymptotic complexity of the high atomicity enhancement algorithm is the same as the complexity of adding failsafe fault-tolerance to a fault-intolerant program. In this sense, in High Atomicity Enhancement, the recovery is preserved for free!
Enhancement for Distributed Programs
In this section, we present an algorithm to enhance the faulttolerance level of a distributed nonmasking fault-tolerant program to masking. First, we discuss the issues involved in the enhancement problem for distributed programs. Then, we present our enhancement algorithm for distributed programs (in the low atomicity model). As a case study, we apply our algorithm to the Byzantine agreement problem.
In high atomicity model, the main issue in enhancing the faulttolerance level of a nonmasking fault-tolerant program Ô was to ensure that Ô does not execute a safety violating transition´×¼ × ½µ. In order to achieve this goal, we can either (i) ensure that Ô will never reach ×¼, or (ii) remove´×¼ × ½µ. For the high atomicity model, we chose the latter option as it was strictly a better choice. However, for distributed programs, we cannot simply remove a safety violating transition´×¼ × ½µ as´×¼ × ½µ could be grouped with some other transitions (due to read restrictions). Thus, removal of´×¼ × ½µ will also remove other transitions that are potentially useful recovery transitions. In other words, for distributed programs, the second choice is not necessarily the best option. Since an appropriate choice from the above two options cannot be identified easily for distributed programs, the synthesis of distributed programs becomes more difficult.
We develop our Low Atomicity Enhancement algorithm by tailoring the high atomicity algorithm to deal with this grouping of transitions. More specifically, given a nonmasking fault-tolerant program Ô, we first start by calculating a high atomicity fault-span, Ì ¼ , which is closed in Ô . Since the low atomicity model is more restrictive than the high atomicity model and Ì ¼ is the largest fault-span for a high atomicity program (cf. [ 
The algorithm Low Atomicity Enhancement is sound and its complexity is polynomial in the state space of the nonmasking fault-tolerant program (For proof, please see [10] .).
Modifications/Improvements for Low Atomicity Enhancement.
There are several improvements that can be made for the above algorithm. We discuss these improvements and issues related to completeness below.
(1) In the above algorithm, if the value of Ë¾ is the empty set then we can break out of the loop before computing Ë¿. Subsequently, we can use value of Ë ¼ ÐÓÛ at that time to compute Ô ¼ and Ì ¼ . However, we continue in the loop to determine whether recovery can be added from new states. This allows the possibility that a larger fault-span is computed and additional transitions are included in the masking fault-tolerant program (As mentioned in [1] , this is a desirable feature for an automatic algorithm).
(2) In the above algorithm, in the calculation of Ë¿, we calculate states from where recovery is possible. One heuristic is to focus on states in Ë¾ first as recovery must be added from states in Ë¾. If recovery from states in Ë¾ is not possible then other states in Ì ¼ Ë ¼ ÐÓÛ should be considered. However, considering states in Ë¾ alone may be insufficient as it may not be possible to add recovery from those states in one step; adding recovery from other states can help in recovering from states in Ë¾.
(3) Our algorithm is incomplete in that it may be possible to enhance the fault-tolerance of a given nonmasking program although our algorithm fails to find it. One of the causes for incompleteness is in our calculation of Ä Á; when Ä Á needs to remove states/transitions to deal with grouping of transitions, the choice is non-deterministic. Since this choice may be inappropriate, the algorithm is incomplete. Based on [11] , where we showed that adding failsafe fault-tolerance to distributed programs is NP-hard, it is expected that the complexity of a deterministic sound and complete algorithm for enhancing the fault-tolerance of a distributed nonmasking program will be exponential unless È AE È .
Example: Byzantine Agreement
We show how our algorithm for the low atomicity model is used to enhance the fault-tolerance level of a nonmasking Byzantine agreement program to masking. First, we present the nonmasking program, its invariant, its safety specification, faults, the fault-span for the given faults, and read/write restrictions. Finally, we show how our algorithm is used to obtain the masking program (in [4] ) for Byzantine agreement.
Variables for Byzantine agreement. The nonmasking program consists of three non-general processes Ð and a general . Each non-general process has three variables , and . Variable represents the decision of a non-general process , denotes whether has finalized its decision, and denotes whether is Byzantine or not. Process also has a variable and . Thus, the variables and their corresponding domains in the Byzantine agreement program are as follows:
Ð× , and Ð ¼ ½ .
Transitions of the nonmasking program.
If process has not copied a value from the general, action AE ½ copies the decision of the general. If has copied a decision and as a result is different from then can finalize its decision by action AE ¾. If process reaches a state, where its decision is not equal to the majority of decisions and all the non-general processes have decided then corrects its decision by actions AE ¿ or AE . Thus, the actions of each process in the nonmasking program are as follows:
The safety specification requires that if is Byzantine, all the non-general non-Byzantine processes should finalize with the same decision (agreement). If is not Byzantine, then the decision of every non-general non-Byzantine process should be the same as (validity). Thus, safety is violated if the program reaches a state in Ë × , where (in this section, unless otherwise specified, quantifications are on non-general processes)
Also, a transition violates safety if it changes the decision of a process after it has finalized. Thus, the set of transitions that violate safety is equal to Ø × , where
Invariant. 
we trace two iterations of the main loop in our algorithm in order to illustrate the way that our algorithm works.
First iteration.
To calculate Ë¾, we search for states in Ë 
Continuing thus, we get the masking fault-tolerant Byzantine agreement; this program is the same as that in [4] . The actions of this program are as follows:
Enhancement versus Addition
In this section, we compare the cost of adding masking faulttolerance to a fault-intolerant distributed program and the cost of enhancing the fault-tolerance of a nonmasking fault-tolerant distributed program to masking.
Asymptotically speaking, adding masking (respectively, failsafe) fault-tolerance to a fault-intolerant distributed program is NP-hard [1, 11] . Therefore, it is expected that the enhancement problemthat adds safety while preserving recovery-for distributed programs will also be NP-hard. Although the enhancement problem may not provide relief in terms of the worst-case complexity, we find that it helps in developing heuristics that determine if safe recovery is possible from states that are reached in the presence of faults. More specifically, consider a state, say ×, that is reached in a computation of the fault-intolerant program in the presence of faults. While adding masking fault-tolerance to a fault-intolerant program, we need to exhaustively search all possible transition sequences originating at × to determine if recovery from × is possible.
By contrast, while enhancing the fault-tolerance of a nonmasking fault-tolerant program, we reuse the recovery provided by the nonmasking fault-tolerant program. Hence, we need to check only the transition sequences that the nonmasking fault-tolerant program can produce. It follows that deriving heuristics that determine if safe recovery is possible from a given state is simpler in the enhancement problem.
The enhancement problem also allows us to deduce additional information about states by reasoning in the high atomicity model. While adding masking fault-tolerance to a fault-intolerant program, it is difficult to check that all computations that (1) start from ×½, (2) in which becomes Byzantine, and (3) in which changes to ¼ are deadlock states. Moreover, if we ignore the grouping restrictions imposed by the low atomicity model, i.e., if we could read and write all variables in one atomic step, recovery is possible from ×½. However, in the context of the enhancement problem, we concluded that even in the high atomicity model, we could not recover from state ×½ by reusing the transitions of the nonmasking fault-tolerant program.
We expect that such high atomicity reasoning will play an important role in reducing complexity in the enhancement problem. To reduce the complexity of adding fault-tolerance in the low atomicity model, it is desirable to reason about the input program in the high atomicity model, obtain a high atomicity masking fault-tolerant program, and modify that high atomicity masking fault-tolerant program so that the restrictions of the low atomicity model are satisfied while preserving the masking fault-tolerance. As the Byzantine agreement example illustrates, this approach can be followed while enhancing the fault-tolerance of a nonmasking fault-tolerant program. However, this approach could not be used while adding masking faulttolerance to a fault-intolerant program.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented the problem that dealt with enhancing the fault-tolerance level of a nonmasking program to masking. This problem separates (1) the task of recovery, and (2) the task of maintaining the safety specification during recovery. For the high atomicity model, we presented a sound and complete algorithm for the enhancement problem. We showed that the complexity of our high atomicity algorithm is asymptotically less than Ñ × Ò algorithm from [1] . For distributed programs, we presented a sound algorithm for the enhancement problem. We also showed that our fault-tolerance enhancement algorithm for distributed programs resolves some of the difficulties encountered in adding safe recovery transitions in [2] .
As an illustration of our algorithms, we showed how masking faulttolerant programs for TMR (in high atomicity model) and Byzantine agreement (for distributed programs) can be designed by enhancing the fault-tolerance of the corresponding nonmasking programs. We chose these examples as masking fault-tolerant versions of these programs have been manually designed from the corresponding nonmasking fault-tolerant versions [3] . The results in this paper show that those enhancements can in fact be automated as well. Also, we argued that enhancing the fault-tolerance of a distributed program is simpler than adding fault-tolerance to its faultintolerant version. We validated this result by comparing the derivation of a masking fault-tolerant Byzantine agreement program from the corresponding fault-intolerant version and from the corresponding nonmasking version.
The synthesis approach in this paper focuses on addition of faulttolerance to an existing program. Thus, it differs from solutions (e.g., [8, 9, [12] [13] [14] ) where one begins with a specification and obtains a fault-tolerant program. Related work on addition of fault-tolerance to an existing program includes [1, 2, 11] . In [1] , authors have shown that the problem of adding masking fault-tolerance to distributed programs is NP-hard. A heuristic based solution for adding masking fault-tolerance is presented in [2] . The algorithm in [2] adds safety and recovery simultaneously to a fault-intolerant program. As discussed in Sections 5.2, we simplify the addition of recovery transitions by reasoning about the feasibility of adding recovery in the high atomicity model and using the acquired knowledge in the low atomicity model to reduce the complexity. Hence, our enhancement algorithm is simpler than the polynomial time synthesis algorithm of [2] . Thus, if a nonmasking fault-tolerant program is available (or can be manually designed) then our approach simplifies the design of masking fault-tolerance.
